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Recent Cases

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE
PROVIDING FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF PARENTS
FOR TUITION EXPENSES AT NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS
VIOLATES FIRST AMENDMENT ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE BY HAVING PRIMARY EFFECT
OF ADVANCING RELIGION

Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973)
"'Congress' and the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment 'shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.' "'
According to the United States Supreme Court, 2 the Pennsylvania
legislature attempted to do exactly that by enacting the Pennsylvania Parent Reimbursement Act for Nonpublic Education. 3 The
Act, which was passed in an effort to support the continued existence of nonpublic schools in order to avoid adverse financial consequences on the public school system, 4 provided for reimbursement
of tuition paid by parents whose children attend nonpublic schools.5
The constitutional question was whether the Act violated the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution by exceeding accepted Supreme Court tests against the establishment of religion.
In upholding the ruling of the district court which had declared
the Act unconstitutional,6 the United States Supreme Court held
that the Act had the effect of providing "sponsorship" or "financial
support" of religion, and that the Act was not severable so as to
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 835 (1973).
Id. at 833.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5701-5711 (1971).
Id. at § 5702.
Id. at §§ 5706, 5707.
Lemon v. Sloan, 340 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 833 (1973).

permit reimbursement for tuition paid by parents at private nonsectarian schools.8
In the past three decades the Supreme Court has focused its
interpretation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause in the
general area of aid to nonpublic schools and religious institutions.
The decisions have sought to distinguish between direct aid to religious institutions only and that to all parents or all educational
institutions equally, with only the latter type being constitutionally
permissible. In 1947 the Supreme Court ruled on reimbursement
of parents for public transportation expenditures.9 Although parents supporting sectarian schools were also reimbursed, the Court
ruled the program constitutional as general welfare legislation since
all parents of school children received the benefits. 10 The Court
warned, however, that the State could not "contribute tax-raised
funds to the support of an institution which teaches the tenets and
faith of any church."" In 1968 the free loan of State owned texts
on secular subjects to all students at both public and nonpublic
schools was ruled constitutional as a general welfare program for
the benefit of all children. 12 In 1970 the Court upheld a tax exemption which included realty used exclusively for religious purposes
since the class of beneficiaries included other non-profit, quasi-public corporations such as hospitals, libraries, and playgrounds. 13
Construction grants to all educational institutions, including nonsectarian and church affiliated colleges and universities, were ruled
constitutional in 1971.14
From this series of cases seeking to distinguish between direct
and indirect aid to schools, the Supreme Court has developed three
considerations which must be analyzed before a statute can be declared constitutionally permissible under the Establishment Clause.
In Tilton v. Richardson 5 the Court phrased the three elements of
the test as a series of interrogatives:
First, does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose?
Second, is the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit religion? Third, does the administration of the Act
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion? 16
8.

td. at 834.

9. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The expenditures were authorized by a local board of education under New Jersey legislation providing for transportation to all schools. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 16.
Id.
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968).
Walz v. Tax Commission, 297 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). A twenty year restric-

tion against use for religious purposes was declared invalid, however, be-

cause of the possible future sectarian benefit. Id. at 683.
15. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
16. Id. at 678. Tilton also expressed a fourth element, whether the implementation of the Act inhibits the free exercise of religion. The element
has not been applied separately, however, because the concern is suffici-
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In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberties v. Ny-

quist,1 7 a companion case decided the same day as Sloan, the Court

stated that the "now well defined three-part test that has emerged
from our decisions is a product of considerations derived from the
full sweep of the Establishment Clause cases."' 8
The statute at issue in Sloan was enacted by the Pennsylvania
legislature after an earlier act' 9 providing for reimbursement was
declared unconstitutional in Lemon v. Kurtzman.20 The first act
provided for "reimbursement [directly to] nonpublic schools for
teacher's salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials used in the
teaching of specific secular subjects ....

-21

The Act contained pre-

scribed accounting procedures for identifying the separate costs of
secular educational services, and made such accounts subject to
to state audit.22

Applying the three-part test already confirmed

in Tilton, the 1971 opinion ruled the Act unconstitutional on the
basis of the "entanglement" test.

The state would be forced into

an excessive degree of entanglement with religion in attempting
ently covered with the second inquiry into primary effect. Id.
The history of this three-part test began in Everson v. Board of Education, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). For the purposes of this note the quotation has
been sectioned into three parts respectively denoting the basic principles
later refined into the now well established three-part test concerning (A)
legislative intent, (B) primary effect and (C) entanglement:
The establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: [A] Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. [B] Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. . . . No tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions. . . . [C] Neither can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of
separation between Church and State."
Id. at 16-17.
In Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the Court
looked to the purposes and primary effect of the enactment and posed the
criterion that "[if
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then
the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by
the Constitution." Id. at 222. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion established the basis for the later "entanglement" test, interpreting the Establishment Clause to forbid involvements employing the means -of government
to effect essentially religious purposes. Id. at 231. The first use of a
three-part test was made by the Court in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664 (1970), holding that "establishment of religion connotes sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity." Id. at 668.
17. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
18. Id. at 772.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-5608 (1971).
20. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
21. Id. at 609.
22. Id. at 610.

to regulate which courses and materials would be chosen, in enforcing the exclusion of "any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect," in administering
the accounting procedures and in conducting the subsequent audits. 23

Without deciding on the primary effect of the Act, the Court

referred to that element of the test by comparing aid to parents
and children in Everson and Allen, and distinguishing on the basis
that in this case the aid was to be paid directly to the school. 2'
In enacting the Pennsylvania Parent Reimbursement Act for
Nonpublic Education, 25 the Pennsylvania legislature attempted to
avoid the constitutional problems of entanglement which invalidated the earlier act, and to avoid the caution against direct aid
to the schools in the Lemon decision. Rather than make payments
directly to the schools and establish complex auditing procedures
to regulate expenditures, the new act provided for payment to the
parents in the form of reimbursement for tuition expenses. Because the nonpublic schools fulfilled the compulsory school attendance requirements under Pennsylvania law and the requirements
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the legislature apparently
believed the tuition reimbursement to be authorized. 2 Furthermore, the reimbursement was for a school year already completed,
thereby apparently eliminating any direct benefit to the nonpublic
schools. The shift in emphasis did not meet the scrutiny of the
Supreme Court, however, and the attempt to avoid the constitutional problems involved in aid to nonpublic schools failed once
again.
In any application of the tests against the establishment of religion it is necessary to realize what grounds of policy or polity
are being threatened. Three grounds seem evident to safeguard
the first amendment. They are "voluntarism in matters of religion,
mutual abstention of the political and the religious caretakers, and
government neutrality toward religions and between religions and
non-religion. ' 2 The first of these equates with the Free Exercise
Clause, which does not figure to any significant extent in Sloan.
Mutual abstention speaks to the excessive entanglement consideration, and is based on the need for separateness both for the identity
and integrity of religion and to avoid intensifying sectarian influences in local politics at one of its most sensitive points.2 8 Government neutrality speaks to the primary effect portion of the three23., Id. at 621.
24" Id.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5701-5711 (1971).
26. Lemon v. Sloan, 340 F. Supp. 1356, 1358 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Title VI
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or national origin in
programs receiving federal financial assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2000d (6)
(1970).
27. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HMAv. L. REv. 1680,
1684 (1969).
28. Id. at 1686.
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part test and has inherent weaknesses in that its application revolves around such elusive concepts as definitions of religious or
non-religious activities, and on balances between the other considerations.2 9 Because of these weaknesses inherent in the concept
of government neutrality, and in turn in the "primary effect" test,
cases decided on this basis are less likely to be legally disposed of
with any consistency. It is for this very reason that the Court is
still struggling with the "primary effect" test in Sloan. 0 It is for
this same reason that future litigation may see a movement away
from this test and a stronger, more forceful reliance on the "entanglement" test.
In applying the three-part test to the Parent Reimbursement
Act, the Supreme Court stated that the legislative intent was unquestionably legitimate. It agreed with the district court which
held that "the Act expresses a legitimate secular objective consistent with the Establishment Clause."' 3 1

The legislative findings

set forth in the Act 2 establish that the cost of public education
is significantly reduced by the existence of nonpublic schools,33 but
that parents may not be able to carry this financial burden in the
future. However, as stated by Justice Powell in the Nyquist opinion, written the same day as Sloan and often referred to in the
latter case for elaboration, "the propriety of a legislature's purposes
may not immunize from further scrutiny a law which either has
a primary effect that advances religion, or which fosters excessive
entanglements between Church and State." 3'
Upon such further scrutiny, the Supreme Court in Sloan held
that the primary effect of the Act was to advance religion and that
the Act was therefore unconstitutional.35 In determining the pri29.

Id.

30. Justice Powell admits that the Court's decisions on primary effect
knay present an "insoluble paradox." 413 U.S. 825, 835 (1973); referring to
Justice White's dissent in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 668 (1971). He
lays the blame not with the doctrines expressed in the test elements, but
rather with the wording of the Establishment Clause itself.
31. Lemon v. Sloan, 340 F. Supp. 1356, 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5702 (1971).
33. Id. The Act estimates that if the public schools were flooded with
presently enrolled nonpublic school students the added annual cost of public education would increase by $400,000,000 and new capital costs would
be incurred in excess of $1,000,000,000. Id.
34. Comm. for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 774 (1973).
35. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973). The district court had set
forth five points of reference from earlier Supreme Court cases for applying
the "primary effect" test. Briefly stated they.are that secular and religious
education can be identifiable and separable; that the state has a legitimate

mary effect of legislation to aid nonpublic schools, "[t] he school
aid cases emphasize that the courts must examine the character of
the aided activity rather than the manner in which aid is given
.
"36
"...Under the Act a primary condition for receipt of the aid
3 7
is that parents have already paid tuition at a nonpublic school.
By providing parents with additional funds because they
have paid tuition -atnonpublic schools, the Commonwealth
is trying to insure the continued ability of the parents to
afford tuition costs and therefore the continued existence
of nonpublic schools, including sectarian schools. The
necessary effect of such a program, if it is to succeed, is
that the schools will be aided by state funds. The state
cannot maintain that the Act has the purpose of promoting
education by supporting nonpublic schools and then deny
that the effect of the Act is to aid those schools.38
The effect of the Supreme Court ruling in Sloan is not intended
to give credence to the argument generally posed by dissenting
opinions in earlier cases that aid to parents is in every case merely
a substitute conduit for direct aid to sectarian schools. 3 9

Justice

Powell's Nyquist opinion makes clear that "the fact that aid is disbursed to parents rather than to the schools is only one among
many factors to be considered. '40 Delivering the Sloan opinion Justice Powell addresses himself directly to this issue. Relying on the
basis that the state has singled out a specific class for a special
interest in promoting the general welfare and secular education of all school
children; that legislation may reflect such interest even to aid sectarian
schools if the aid has no religious significance; that programs may be enacted to aid secular education in all schools if such aid can be accomplished
without excessive entanglement; and that use of public funds by sectarian
schools need not necessarily be concluded to aid religion. Lemon v. Sloan,
340 F. Supp. 1356, 1362-63 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
With these considerations in mind an examination of certain specific
sections of the Act highlights the issues confronting the Supreme Court. The
public funding was to come from revenue collected as part of the cigarette
tax. Eligibility was contingent on completion of the school year in a nonpublic school and on presentation of a receipted tuition bill. The actual reimbursement to the parents was set at $75 for each elementary school child
and $150 for each secondary school child, or the actual tuition if less than
the specified amount. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5705-07 (1971).
One further consideration in judging the actual effect of such legislation
is that "more than 90% of the children attending nonpublic schools in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are enrolled in schools that are controlled
by religious organizations or that have the purpose of propagating and promoting religious faith." Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830 (1973).
36. Lemon v. Sloan, 340 F. Supp. 1356, 1364 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
37. See note 35 supra.
38. Lemon v. Sloan, 340 F. Supp. 1356, 1364 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
39. See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 252 (1968) (Black
dissenting); Id. at 255 (Douglas dissenting). A similar argument is that a
sectarian institution has only one budget, and that any aid to an operation
within that budget, whether secular or sectarian aid, will free parts of the
budget not otherwise available for sectarian purposes. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 694-95 (1971) (Douglas dissenting).
40. Comm. for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 781 (1973).
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economic benefit, he reasoned that whether such benefit be viewed
as "a simple tuition subsidy, as an incentive to parents to send their
children to sectarian schools, or as a reward for having done so,
at bottom its intended consequence is to preserve and support
'

religion-oriented institutions."'4

This effect was considered to be a much clearer breach of the
constitutional sanctions than any "indirect" or "incidental" benefits
which flowed to sectarian schools from the programs in Everson
and Allen which provided aid for all parents by supplying bus
transportation and secular textbooks for their children. 42 The "primary effect" test appears to be little more than a negligence "proximate cause" type of exercise in drawing lines. While the Court does
seem to have consistently drawn the lines on the basis of a few
established criteria, 43 the problem for the future will be to continue
to apply this nebulous test to the more complex fact situations
which will certainly confront the Court in the future.
Justices Burger 44 and White 45 each wrote dissenting opinions
applying both to Nyquist and Sloan in which Justice Rehnquist concurred. Justice Burger's dissent is based on "one solid basic principle" derived from the Establishment Clause cases that governments
may enact programs of general welfare even though some aid to
religious institutions results. 46 The principle is sound, but in the
situations he develops the factual distinctions are constitutionally
significant. One example 47 involves an early Supreme Court decision in Quick Bear v. Leupp. 48 He argues that the government
funds appropriated to the Indians were used to directly support
sectarian schools. 49 The essential difference is that the money was
41. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973).
42. Id.
43. One criterion for constitutionality is that the aid in question benefits
all children or all parents. The fact that some of the children or parents
in turn support sectarian schools is not enough to invalidate a program of
general welfare. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1947); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968).
A second criterion is that aid going directly to the educational institutions must go equally to all such institutions. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971).
44. Comm. for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v.Nyquist, 413 U.S.
798 (1973) (Burger dissenting to both Nyquist and Sloan).
45. Comm. for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
813 (1973) (White dissenting to both Nyquist and Sloan).
46. Comm. for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
798, 799 (1973) (Burger dissenting).
47. Id. at 801.
48. 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
49. Comm. for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
798, 801 (1973) (Burger dissenting).

not the government's to control. One fund was Indian money
held in trust by the government; 50 another was government money
appropriated annually in satisfaction of treaty or land sale obligations. 51 The purpose of the appropriation was not to take money
from public funds for the support of sectarian schools, but to satisfy
an obligation to the Indians themselves. A second situation concerns the "G.I. Bills" for education 52 used at sectarian institutions. 3
Again the distinction revolves around the individual's entitlement.
to the particular funds. The individual in that instance is entitled
to the funds in satisfaction of a secular statutory obligation on the
government. 54 Once he becomes entitled to the money, the government no longer has any interest in the religious nature of the
institution he attends. Justice Burger poses an obvious hypothetical to exemplify impermissible aid to religious institutions. He
admits that "a State could not enact a statute providing for a $10
gratuity to everyone who attended religious services weekly," 55 dismissing
this as an obvious government sponsorship of religious activity. 56 Yet the same type of direct support to religion resulted
from the act in question since the state would provide X dollars
for anyone who would pay at least Y dollars yearly to a religious
institution for education involving religious instruction for their
children.
Justice White defended the concept of reimbursement for the
amount that public education would have cost, but his argument
57
was admittedly made with "[c] onstitutional considerations aside."
Justice White stated that:
[The Supreme Court] should not, absent a clear nandate
in the Constitution, invalidate these New York and Pennsylvania statutes and thereby not only scuttle state efforts
to hold off serious financial problems in their public schools
but also make it more difficult, if not impossible, for parents to follow the dictates of their consciences and seek a
religious as well as secular education for their children.5 8
Although it may not amount to a clear mandate, the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution must be interpreted; the
50. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 80 (1908).
51. Id.
52. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1697A (1973).
53. Comm. for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
798, 804 (1973) (Burger dissenting).
54. The purpose of the statute is to provide funds for those whose education has been denied or interrupted by military service. 38 U.S.C. § 1651
(1973). The distinction is that contrary to education being hampered by
the government in Sloan, a free public education is being offered and rejected by the parents for whom the Act was created to benefit.
55. Comm. for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
798, 801 (1973) (Burger dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Comm. for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
813, 814 (1973) (White dissenting).
58. Id. at 819-20 (emphasis added).
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majority of the Court, and wisely so, has grounded their approach
not on general reasonableness but on a reasonable interpretation
of the Establishment Clause.
Since the Act was found to have as its primary effect the advancement of religion, the Court in Sloan did not consider whether
it also created an excessive entanglement of government and religion. However, as was made clear in the earlier Lemon decision,
an act to be constitutional must also meet the requirements of that
test.59

The Court in Sloan did consider one further argument based
on equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. The argument assumed the Act to be severable so that parents supporting
nonsectarian nonpublic schools could receive the aid. Since parents
supporting nonsectarian schools would then receive aid, the argument reasoned that parents supporting sectarian schools should also
receive the aid as a matter of equal protection. 0 The Court summarily rejected the argument, stating first that the Act was not
severable because too great a percentage of the intended beneficiaries of the Act supported sectarian schools, and therefore severability could not be assumed to be coincident with the legislative
intent, 61 and furthermore that the "Equal Protection Clause has
never been regarded as a bludgeon with which to compel a State
'8 2
to violate other provisions of the Constitution.
The decision in Sloan clearly establishes that the Court is going
to continue to protect the First Amendment Establishment Clause
from legislation which merely attempts to circumvent the constitutional hurdles. Sloan is not a clear precedent establishing
strict criteria under the three-part test, but the case does verify
that any financial benefit which aids only nonpublic schools,
whether fed directly or indirectly into the school itself, will come
under strict judicial scrutiny. The criteria may have to vary from
case to case. In addition, as the reliance on the "entanglement test"
in Lemon indicates, the Court is also willing to apply different tests
in individual cases. One clear lesson from Sloan does emerge: that
general welfare legislation is the only way that nonpublic schools
will be allowed to receive financial support from the states. The
logical progression, it would seem, would be to shift the emphasis
away from legislation attempting to channel support to the nonpublic schools toward a restructuring of all public funded educational
59. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1971).
60. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 834 (1973).
61.
62.

Id.
Id.

systems in an effort to free some funds for distribution in a new
area which would provide equal benefit to nonpublic schools. Ingenuity within the law will be the key, however, because legislation
which passes the "primary effect" test will certainly not escape
close scrutiny under the expanding "entanglement" test.
JACK HARTMAN

EQUAL PROTECTION-MUNICIPAL HOSPITAL
CANNOT REFUSE FACILITIES FOR VOLUNTARY
STERILIZATIONS WHEN PERMITTING BOTH
PROCEDURES OF EQUAL RISK AND
NON-THERAPEUTIC PROCEDURES

Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital, 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973)

Having been denied facilities for a voluntary sterilization by
Worcester City Hospital, Mrs. Robbie Mae Hathaway filed an action
in federal district court for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.1 Although her complaint was dismissed by the district

court, 2 on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, Mrs. Hathaway was granted the sought after equitable relief. 3
Citing Roe v. Wade 4 and Doe v. Bolton,5 decided a mere two months

before, the appellate court declared "the hospital's unique ban on
sterilization violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The district court's refusal to recognize an absolute right in the
plaintiff to demand admission to the defendant hospital's facilities7 was well supported by both the common law s and the traditional interpretation of the discretionary powers of public hospitals
as governed by general authorizing statutes.9 The court of appeals
1. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Mass.
1972), rev'd, 475 F.2d 701 (lst Cir. 1973).
2.

Id. at 1387.

3. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973)
(the issue of damages was not appealed); cf. Doe v. Hale Hospital, 369 F.
Supp. 970 (D. Mass. 1974); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 361 F. Supp. 932 (D.
Minn. 1973).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).

6. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 706 (1st Cir.

1973).

7. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 1385, 1386-87 (D.
Mass. 1972).
8. E.g., Williams v. Hosp. Authority, 119 Ga. App. 626, 627, 168 S.E.2d
336, 337 (1969) ("No hospital, public or private, is under a common law
duty to accept everyone who applies for admission ...
Jur. 2d Hospitals and Asylums § 12 (1968).

").

See also 40 Am.

9. "Governmental hospitals, operated as general hospitals, may limit

their facilities in the same manner as do charitable and proprietary hospitals, excluding certain persons on the basis of the particular disease or
type of care required." PITTSBURGH UNIVERSITY, HEALTH LAW CENTER, PROBLEmS IN HOSPITAL LAW 13 (1968).

The district court's ruling finds lineage in an early Massachusetts case

was similarly aware of a governmental hospital's limited duty to
admit patients, and of the discretionary nature of the admissions
procedure. Thus, after contrasting the defendant's policy banning
all sterilizations with the pro-sterilization practices of two other
local hospitals governed by the same statute 0 as the defendant, the
appellate court concluded:
The differing hospital practices suggest to us the most
obvious and reasonable interpretation of the authorizing
statutes and ordinance: that the range of services to be
provided by the hospital is to be determined by the hospital's board of trustees, limited only by inconsistent provisions of law and the hospital's broad general mandate. 1
Within these guidelines, however, the court was to further find that
the hospital's statutorily granted 2 discretionary power to restrict
the use of facilities was not absolute, but was delimited by the hospital's own on-going use of its facilities.' 3
The plaintiff, a resident of Worcester, was a thirty-six year old
working mother who, during the course of her marriage, had twelve
pregnancies with eight children surviving. Prior to the birth of
plaintiff's eighth child in April of 1971, Mrs. Hathaway's personal
physician sought permission for a tubal ligation sterilization1 4 to
decided according to an enactment similar to the specific authorizing statute, MAss. ST. 1953, ch. 266, §§ 2, 4, under which Worcester City Hospital
operated. Ruling on the trustees' responsibility toward those who seek admission to a public charitable hospital, the court stated:
[T]he trustees ... are themselves to determine who are to be the
immediate objects of the charity, and . . . no person has individ-

ually a right to demand admission ....
All cannot participate in
its benefits; the trustees are those to whom it is confided the duty

of selecting those who shall enjoy them, and prescribing the terms

upon which they shall do so.
McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 435, 21 Am. R.
529, 532 (1876).
10. MAss. GEN. LAws AnN. ch. 40, § 5 (1968):
A town may at any town meeting appropriate money for the exercise of its corporate powers, including the following purposes:
(20) For the erection and maintenance of a hospital for the reception of persons requiring relief during temporary sickness.
Such hospitals shall be managed by trustees or other officers
and agents appointed with ordinances, rules or regulations
made by the city council or the town.
11. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 704 (lst Cir. 1973).
12. The specific authorizing statute, MAss. ST. 1953, ch. 266, § 2, states:
The Worcester City Hospital is established for the reception of
persons requiring relief during temporary sickness, including
paying patients, and of such persons settled in the City of Worcester who by misfortune or poverty may require such relief.
Section 4 of the same statute gives the trustees the power to make such administrative regulations for the hospital as the trustees deem expedient.
13. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 705 (1st Cir.
1973).
14. Tubal ligation,
if performed at delivery and under the same anesthetic used for
childbirth . . . is fast (usually less than twenty minutes operating

time) and ninety-nine percent sure. Such surgery does not prolong
hospital stay and eliminates patient failure with minimum subsequent morbidity.
Forbes, Voluntary Sterilization of Women as a Right, 18 DE PAUL L. RaV.
560, 562 (1969).
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follow the scheduled childbirth at defendant hospital. 15 The hospital administrator, however, specifically refused the request.'0
Moreover, after delivery all additional requests were similarly denied. These refusals were based on the hospital's pre-existing general ban on all sterilizations and were not made in response to any
facts of plaintiff's particular situation.
In her complaint plaintiff contended that a tubal ligation was
not merely a contraceptive procedure in her case, but was both therapeutic and medically necessary because serious poor health made
future pregnancies dangerous to her life. Mrs. Hathaway's physician had recommended the surgical sterilization because ordinary
means of contraception were medically unavailable to the plaintiff.17
The physician's advice was never contested by the defendant. 8
Plaintiff further claimed that Worcester City Hospital was the
only reasonable facility for the desired operation. Although the
Hathaway family was not on public welfare, it was nevertheless
asserted that due to the family's meager income, and the inapplicability of Mr. Hathaway's medical insurance to sterilization procedures, the tubal ligation was financially possible only at defendant
municipal hospital.1 9 Although not a charitable institution per se,
15. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir.
1973).
16. The administrator, the chief of obstetrics, and the president of the
hospital's board of trustees were joined as defendants in the action along
with the hospital itself. Id.
17. Mrs. Hathaway's physician stated that the plaintiff suffered from
high blood pressure and heavy menstrual flow. These factors made the use
of contraceptive drugs and the use of foams or intra-uterine devices either
dangerous or simply ineffective. It was also stated that due to the combined effects of Mrs. Hathaway's high blood pressure, umbilical hernia, and
complications caused by twelve previous pregnancies, plaintiff's life would
be threatened by any subsequent pregnancy. Hathaway v. Worcester City
Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (D. Mass. 1972).
18. However, the district court did have its own thoughts on the matter:
What the plaintiff seems to regard as significant is that her appetite for sexual intercourse is so fundamental and so like an appetite
for food that she is being denied equal protection if she is not permitted freely and without risk, to enjoy such intercourse with her
husband, he not wearing a condom which conceivably (if that be
the right word) may reduce tactile pleasure. Obviously the plaintiff does not think it appropriate that she should be forced by her
condition to refrain from sexual intercourse.
Id. at 1393.
19. Neighboring private hospitals were financially out of reach. The
Hathaway's combined family income was $7500 and below the federally established poverty level for a family of ten. Medical insurance, as supplied
by Mr. Hathaway's Blue Cross and Blue Shield policies, covered the expenses of childbirth but not of any subsequent tubal litigation. Hathaway
v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir. 1973).

defendant hospital, because of its specific authorizing statute 2 and
actual admissions policy, was prepared to admit the plaintiff regardless of her ability to pay.2 1 The only impediment to admission
was the fact that facilities had been requested for an operation
banned by the hospital.
Defendant was an unincorporated municipal institution termed
an "acute short-term general hospital." 22 As defined by statute,
the hospital was intended "for the reception of persons requiring
relief during temporary sickness.' ' 23 As such, the hospital was not
equipped to offer all possible medical services. It did include, however, in its range of services not only therapeutic 24 operations, but
prophylactic and cosmetic surgery as well.2

5

Nevertheless, and de-

spite the fact that two area municipal hospitals in Cambridge and
Boston, acting under the same general authorizing statute as Worcester, regularly performed this sterilization operation, Worcester
City Hospital had never allowed the relatively simple tubal ligation
procedure.

26

In its answer to Mrs. Hathaway's complaint, defendant supported the denial of its facilities to the plaintiff by reference to an
advisory opinion it had received on June 30, 1970, from the Worcester
City Assistant Solicitor.2 7 The opinion stated that the specific authorizing statute could be interpreted as permitting only therapeutic procedures.28 Furthermore, in the opinion the Assistant
Solicitor had concluded that, in the context of both statutory
law then in force in the Commonwealth 29 and Commonwealth
20. MASS. ST. 1953, ch. 266, § 2 (quoted in note 12 supra).
21. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir.
1973).
22. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 1385, 1386 (D.
Mass. 1972).
23. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 5(20) (1968); MASS. ST. 1953, ch.
266, §§ 2,4.
24. "[T]herapeutic:
Pertaining to theurapeutics; curative." BLAKISTON's NEW GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 1235 (2d ed. 1956).
25. By stipulation defendant acknowledged that the scope of its procedures included, but was not limited to, appendectomies, varicose veins,
cystectomies, hemorrhoidectomies, circumcisions, and removal of gall stones.
Plastic and cosmetic surgery, including "nose jobs," were also allowed by
the hospital. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 704 (1st Cir.
1973).
26. See note 14 supra.
27. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 1385, 1390-91 (D.
Mass. 1972).
28. There may be some question as to whether sterilization surgery
would be therapeutic or non-therapeutic in relation to the plaintiff's condition. The issue can be clarified by asking one further question: is the operation meant to relieve, i.e., cure, a specific malady (fertility?) or to prevent one (death) from arising. Viewed in this manner, it is submitted that
the tubal ligation would have to be seen as prophylactic, i.e., non-therapeutic. The appellate court avoided the question by simply never posing
it.
29. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 19, 20, 21A (1968). Sections
19 and 20 are antiabortion statutes; § 21A allows the dispensing of contraceptives only by licensed physicians and only to married persons. Massachusetts had no statute forbidding voluntary sterilization per se at the time
of this action.
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v. Baird,3 0 surgical sterilization was both of doubtful legality
and contrary to Massachusetts' public policy opposing birth
control. Pointing to the lack of any specific statutory authority prohibiting voluntary sterilization, 3' plaintiff argued to the
contrary and challenged the constitutionality of the municipal hospital's ban on sterilization procedures.3 2 In the appeal from the
subsequent dismissal, plaintiff enumerated those constitutional guarantees that the sterilization ban violated as follows: the right to
marital privacy,33 the right to life and liberty (fifth and fourteenth
amendments), freedom of choice as to whether or not to bear children (eighth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments), and, the right of
equal protection (fifth and fourteenth amendments).34
In bringing her case initially before federal court plaintiff
claimed jurisdiction under the federal statute governing state deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed rights. 35 However, the district
court, in its first ruling on the case, dismissed the suit on both jurisdictional and constitutional grounds. The court in doing so first
held that the defendant hospital was not a "person" within the intent of the controlling federal statute"6 and therefore not subject to
the jurisdiction of the court. 37 It next found that no constitutional
30. 355 Mass. 746, 247 N.E.2d 574 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1029
(1970). In this case, the high court of Massachusetts ruled on the constitutionality of MASS. GEN. LAw ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (1968) which banned the
dissemination of information on the dispensing of contraceptives. The court

held the section unconstitutional to the degree that it made it unlawful to
exhibit contraceptive devices before the public. However, the statute was
upheld to the extent that it outlawed the unlicensed dispensing of contra-

ceptives to another person. Id. at 754, 247 N.E.2d at 580.
31. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
32. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 1385, 1389 (D.
Mass. 1972).
33. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). Defendant Griswold had been convicted in a Connecticut court of violating CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958 rev.) which in effect banned the use
and counsel concerning the use of contraceptives. Defendant had given
contraception advice to certain married persons. In declaring the sections
violative of due process, the Court recognized a right to privacy in the
marriage relationship which could not be invaded by governmental control.
34. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (D.
Mass. 1972).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States of other per-

son within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law, shall
be liable to the party injured in action at law, suit in equity or

other proper proceedings for redress.
36. Id.
37. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 1385, 1389 (D.
Mass. 1972). The court of appeals in Hathaway recognized that it had juris-
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grounds existed to compel the hospital to furnish facilities for voluntary sterilization "when it is not claimed that doctors have performed such an operation . . for some persons, but have discrimi38
nated against plaintiff."
The case was appealed and remanded by the court of appeals
for further findings prior to the appellate court's decision on the
merits. On remand the district court, apparently impressed by the
reasoning in the Worcester City Assistant Solicitor's opinion, added
a third ground for dismissal. It thus noted that the suit was not
directed at nullifying a state statute on constitutional grounds, but
at altering an institution's policy which was not at variance with
statutory authority. For it to order a hospital to foresake its discretionary powers and open its facilities to a particular operation,
the court concluded, would amount to an exercise of legislative au39
thority, a function beyond the scope of the judiciary.
Unlike the district court, the court of appeals avoided the conclusion that overruling the defendant's ban on voluntary sterilizations would amount to -a legislative act. Instead, the court approached the question of the hospital's authority by reasoning that
the authorizing statute did not restrict the defendant to a fixed set
of treatments, but granted the hospital wide latitude in making procedures available to those seeking treatment. Hence, under such a
statute the hospital's discretion could not be arbitrarily applied, but
rather must be based upon criteria consonant with the hospital's
purpose as reflected in evolving medical procedures and current
use of facilities. A judicable question therefore arises if the hospital,
by ignoring its own practical criteria, arbitrarily refuses its premises for a particular procedure. If the refusal amounts to a denial
of a party's constitutionally guaranteed rights, including the right
to protection of the law and the guarantees enumerated in Roe v2.
Wade 40 and Doe v. Bolton,41 then the court could enjoin the hospital from effectuating its decision.42
The specific issues to which the court of appeals addressed itself were: ' (1) whether voluntary sterilizations were illegal either
diction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), but by granting injunctive relief
against the "relevant supervising hospital officials," rather than against the
hospital itself, sidestepped the determination reached by the district court.
Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 707 n.7 (lst Cir. 1973).
38. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 1385, 1389 (D.
Mass. 1972).
39. Id. at 1387.
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
42. By limiting itself to this approach the court found no need to rule
on some interesting and possibly determinative collateral issues. It withheld consideration of the possible unconstitutionality of geographic residency requirements set by the state general authorizing statute for admission to municipal hospitals. It similarly found no necessity to decide on the
constitutional significance of the fact that the hospital's ban affected mainly
the poor or that the ban reflected the position of a certain religious group.
Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 707 n.6 (lst Cir. 1973).
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under the Massachusetts antiabortion or contraception statutes;
(2) whether a voluntary sterilization procedure was necessarily
excluded from the meaning of "relief during temporary sickness"
as used by state statute and as reflected in the practices of Worcester City Hospital; (3) whether defendant's prohibition of voluntary sterilization at its facilities was a proper exercise of its regulatory powers; (4) whether there existed a compelling state interest that would justify such a ban by a municipal hospital; and (5)
under the reasoning in Doe, whether a unique prohibition of a particular operation, medically indistinguishable from allowed proce43
dures was in itself violative of the equal protection clause.
The court of appeals quickly disposed of the issue of the legality of voluntary sterilization in Massachusetts. Defendant's argument had been based on an opinion rendered in 1970 by Worcester's assistant city solicitor which interpreted state law as declaring
a public policy contrary to sterilization. Citing Roe v. Wade,44 Doe
v. Bolton45 and Eisenstadtv. Baird,46 the court concluded that whatever merit the opinion's argument had at the time, "subsequent
authority makes it clear that the Commonwealth no longer has, or
43. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973).
44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In this case the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional as violative of due process a Texas statute which outlawed
all abortions except when such operation was needed to save the life of the
mother. This decision, while recognizing that a state may have a legitimate
interest in protecting the unborn fetus at a certain stage in its development,
found that a ban on all elective abortions allowed the state to impinge upon
the mother's right of privacy prior to the point at which the state's interest
had become sufficiently compelling to outweigh a woman's fundamental interest in the birth decision.
45. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). This decision dealt with two Georgia statutes
which banned all abortions except: (1) where the pregnancy endangered
the mother's health or life; (2) where the pregnancy was the result of rape;
or (3) where the child was likely to be born with a serious and permanent
mental or physical defect. Additionally, one of the provisions required that
the personal physician's decision to have the operation performed be confirmed by at least two other physicians and by the hospital's abortion committee, procedures not required, as a matter of state criminal law, of any
other operation in Georgia. The court found these provisions violated due
process in that they were an unnecessary restriction on the physician's right
to practice and an unwarranted state invasion of the right of privacy between physician and patient. The court stopped short, however, of determining the issue in terms of equal protection.
46. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Baird specifically declared that MAss. GEN.
LAWS § 21A (1968), which allowed the dispensing of contraceptives
only to married persons, violated equal protection. In its ruling the Supreme Court recognized the right of the individual "to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear a child or not." Id. at 453.

could have such an all encompassing antibirth control policy.
"47

In its discussion of the second issue the court in effect questioned whether the statutory words "relief during temporary sickness" were to be narrowly defined to mean only those conditions
demanding therapeutic 48 procedures or to be more openly interpreted to include conditions responsive to preventive or non-therapeutic treatment. Because no interpretation of "temporary sickness" or of the specific duties of a general hospital had been attempted by the state, the court looked to the practices of Worcester
City Hospital itself for a working definition. It found that beyond
general therapeutic operations the hospital performed such nontherapeutic procedures as plastic and cosmetic surgery.40 Suggested
in the court's observations was the conclusion that even if voluntary sterilizations were non-therapeutic in nature, as had been argued by the defendant, they were no more so than other procedures performed at the hospital. Furthermore, the court noted
that if one attempted to distinguish tubal ligation from other operations at the hospital according to the degree of risk involved, the
ligation procedure turned out to be of no greater risk than appendectomies regularly performed at Worcester. 0 Thus, by its own practices defendant hospital had failed to medically distinguish the voluntary sterilization plaintiff had requested from "temporary sickness" treatments already being performed at the hospital. By
reviewing the diversity of procedures available at Worcester and
taking into consideration the continually evolving nature of medical practice, the court concluded that the statutory phrase "relief
during temporary sickness" should be liberally construed and constantly expanded in scope so as to permit a wide range of treatments.5 1
47. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 704 (lst Cir.
1973). The question of legality was put in terms of public policy because
Massachusetts lacked a statute covering voluntary sterilization. In fact, at
the time of the district court's ruling, only five states had laws governing
the topic. See Comment, A Woman's Right to Voluntary Sterilization, 22
BUFFALO L. REV. 291, 292-93 (1972).
Pennsylvania's policy on voluntary
sterilization is succinctly expressed in Shaleen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d
41 (C.P. Wyo. 1957), a breach of contract case. In this case, a physician
was sued for failing to perform a totally successful vascetomy, the failure
coming to light, so to speak, when plaintiff's wife later gave birth to a child.
The court ruled, in part, that the agreement for the operation was not void
as against public policy opposing sterilization because there was no public
policy concerning sterilization. Id. at 43. See also, concerning the judicial
assessment of state sterilization policy, Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 CaL
App. 2d 737, 748, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359, 366 (1969).
48. See note 29 supra.
49. See note 25 supra.
50. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 705 (1st Cir.

1973).

51. The court of appeals was quick to add, however, that merely because the statutory words were open to broad definition did not mean that
a general municipal hospital could be required to perform every new proce-
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Having examined the uses to which the hospital permitted its
facilities to be put in the light of statutory authority the court next
considered as a third issue whether the trustees, in maintaining a
ban on all sterilizations, acted within the bounds of their discretionary powers. Although the defendant claimed that the trustees
were legally free to classify procedures as permitted or not permitted as they deemed appropriate, the court of appeals concluded otherwise. The court held that even under the "rational
relationship" test, which states that in order to satisfy the fourteenth amendment any classification which treats those within the
class differently from those without must be fairly and substantially
related to a legitimate legislative purpose and not arbitrarily discriminatory, 52 it was doubtful that such an outright ban on sterilizations could be upheld. In support of this argument, it has been observed that to allow governmental authorities absolute discretion in
making classifications of activities as worthy or unworthy is to invite the arbitrary exercise of those power to the detriment of the
persons affected by those classifications. 3
Thus, the court concluded that where the legislative purpose
in establishing the hospital is broad, administrative discretion in
ruling on a particular procedure must be consistent with that broad
purpose. Here, the legislative purpose, "relief during temporary
sickness," was to be viewed in connection with the hospital's actual
use of its facilities. The trustees, therefore, in rejecting or accepting a procedure were constrained to apply this criterion in a reasonable and non-capricious manner. In other words, where the
procedure in issue, in this case voluntary sterilization, is medically
indistinguishable, either in degree or risk or in therapeutic nature
from already accepted procedures, outright rejection by the trustees
constitutes an arbitrary exercise of discretion, not rationally related to the broad legislative purpose of the hospital and is therefore violative of equal protection. When it is considered that sterilization operations required "no special facilities, equipment or
staff" 54 the abuse of discretion on the part of the trustees becomes
even more apparent.
dure and to treat any condition brought to its door. To require such action
by the institution "would impose vast budgetary, administrative and physical reordering without regard to community or hospital needs." Id.
52. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'r, 394 U.S. 802,
809 (1969).
53. Calvin v. Thompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134, 139
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
54. Hatahway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 705 (1st Cir.
1973).

55
'Concerning the question of a "compelling state interest
which might justify a total ban on sterilizations by a municipal
hospital, the court declared that whatever interest the state might
have in preserving potential fetal existence was significantly inferior to the state's interest in actual fetal life as considered in Roe v.
Wade56 and Doe v. Bolton.57 Thus, because the state's interest in
Roe and Doe was not sufficiently compelling as to outweigh a
woman's fundamental interest and right of privacy in the birth decision, a fortiori the state's interest could not be sufficiently compelling in Hathaway.58 The court further noted that the woman's
interest becomes even more pressing when her very life is threatened by the possibility of future pregnancies. 59 Cognizant of the
woman's fundamental rights declared in Roe and Doe and of the
lack of any compelling state interest in sustaining the continued
reproductive capacity of the plaintiff, the court found the defendant's ban on sterilization too broad to be upheld on the basis of a
compelling state interest. 60
The fifth and final issue decided in Hathaway dealt with the
constitutionality of the uniqueness of the ban on sterilization.
The question was whether a restriction imposed either by institutional policy or specific statute is unconstitutional when it is directed solely at one particular class of procedures. In arriving at
its decision, the court of appeals relied heavily on Doe v. Bolton.61
In Doe, the Supreme Court considered the validity of a statute
which required that a personal physician's' abortion judgment be
confirmed at two different administrative levels. The Court held
that such a statute failed to serve any need of the physician, patient, or hospital and therefore constituted not only an invasion of
the right of privacy of both the physician and patient but also,
since it was only required with respect to abortions, a violation of

due process as well.6 2

The Hathaway court, following the struc-

ture of this decision's analysis,6 3 noted that the prohibition by the
55. A classification which serves to penalize the exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed right, unless shown to uphold a compelling state interest, is unconstitutional. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See note 44 supra.
57. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See note 45 supra.
58. It was noted, however, that the state had a recognizable interest
in protecting the health of the mother by regulating appropriate medical
practices. Nevertheless, because tubal ligation presented no great hazard
to the mother, and its risk was equal to that of an appendectomy, "restrictions on the former should be no greater than those imposed on the latter."
Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 706 n.3 (1st Cir. 1973).
59. Id. at 705.
60. Id. at 706.
61. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
62. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197, 199 (1973).
63. The appellate court in Hathaway acknowledged that the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe was in terms of due process rather than equal protection. However, it also noted the Court's analysis of the interests involved was essentially the same as its own. Hathaway v. Worcester City
Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 706 n.5 (1st Cir. 1973).
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defendant municipal hospital on all sterilizations also was a restriction directed at one procedure. Moreover, the court, working
within an equal protection framework, found that sterilization
was medically indistinguishable from permitted operations, both in
terms of risk and therapeutic nature. It therefore concluded that
the ban in its singular and arbitrary application to sterilization
was an abridgment of the4 plaintiff's constitutional right to equal
protection under the law.

On its surface the Hathaway ruling granting the prayed for
declaratory and injunctive relief represents a limited precedent.
The case does not give a direct ruling on a plaintiff's right to damages for being wrongfully refused admission to a municipal hospital. 65 It does not give a party seeking admission to a govern64. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 706 (1st Cir.
1973). Paralleling Hathaway on this point is a recent federal decision in
New York involving three indigent women who had sought Medicaid financed non-therapeutic abortions at a public hospital. The defendant hospital refused the operations, basing its decision on a directive from the New
York State Commissioner of Social Services. The directive stated that
purely elective abortions were non-therapeutic and therefore not compensable by the state medical care program for indigents. The court found that
since an obviously non-therapeutic procedure, childbirth, was covered by
the Medicaid program and allowed at the hospital, the classification of elective abortions as non-therapeutic and therefore not compensable served no
reasonable function. Such a classification bore no rational relationship to
the pregnancy condition, but rather discriminated against the indigent
woman who chose not to have her child. The directive was therefore declared violative of equal protection. Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 925 (1973) (case
remanded to district court for further consideration in light of Roe v. Wade
and Doe v. Bolton); see also New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Doe v. Mundy, 378 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Minn.
1974); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); Nyberg v. City
of Virginia, 361 F. Supp. 932 (D. Minn. 1973). Contra City of New York
v. Wyman, 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281 N.E.2d 180, 330 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1972).
65. The district court denied plaintiff damages and the issue was not
raised on appeal. Dictum in the'appellate court's opinion suggests, however,
that because the Worcester City Hospital was a department of the municipality, it was not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970),
and therefore not a proper party in a suit for damages. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 707 n.7 (1st Cir. 1973). See Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513-14 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 190-91
(1961).
In contrast to Hathaway two recent cases, McCabe v. Nassau County
Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971) and Chrisman v. Sisters of St.
Joseph of Newark, 40 U.S.L.W. 2101 (D. Ore., July 22, 1971), have upheld
the right to sue for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). In both cases
the plaintiff sought injunctive relief and damages for a hospital's refusal to
allow its facilities to be used for a voluntary sterilization. Furthermore, in
each case, after initiating the action the plaintiff had a sterilization operation performed on her, and the defendant hospital in turn moved to have
the case dismissed because of mootness. In ruling on the motion, the courts

mental hospital the absolute right to request facilities for any therapeutic or non-therapeutic treatment. 6 It does not deny any staff
member of a public hospital the right to refuse to assist in a sterilization procedure.0 7 Finally, the decision does not affect the common law privilege of a private or denominational hospital to turn
away any patient.68
held that the mooting of the claim for injunctive relief did not affect the
claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). In Chrisman,the district
court based its decision on the fact that the plaintiff was "in a strategic position to represent similarly situated persons whose case, like hers, would
never come to trial, if mootness were allowed to bar the door of the court.
." Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Newark, 40 U.S.L.W. 2101 (D.
Ore., July 22, 1971); but see Allen v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 490 F.2d 81, 82
(5th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff's sterilization at another facility prior to suit
mooted the action since operation completely terminated any possibility of
controversy recurring); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 361 F. Supp. 932, 937
(D. Minn. 1973).
66. See note 51 supra.
67. This leaves open the possibility that a party might obtain facilities
but no hospital staff. The privilege of a staff member to refuse to assist
in a particular operation is at times protected by statute. In Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, 198 (1973) the court recognized the validity of the provision
in the Georgia abortion statute which stated that no hospital staff member
who objects on moral or religious grounds shall be made to assist in an
abortion procedure. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1201(e) (1971).
Pennsylvania, by recent amendment of the Human Relations Act, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 951-962 (1973), has mandated the right of the hospital
or health center staff member to refuse on moral, religious, or professional
grounds to participate in either sterilization or abortion procedures. PA.
STAT. AN. tit. 43, § 955 (Supp. 1974).

With regard to hospitals receiving federal funding under the Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291(c) (1974), Congress has just recently enacted
the Health Programs Extension Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(a) (1) (1974), which
provides in part that the mere fact that a private or denominational health
facility receives federal funding does not authorize a federal court to require that an individual at that facility assist in an abortion or sterilization
when such would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.
68. It has been ruled elsewhere, however, that a denominational private hospital, partially funded by the federal government, is liable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) for refusing its facilities to a party seeking a voluntary sterilization. The private hospital's prohibition of voluntary sterilization, therefore, raises the constitutional issue of equal protection under the
law. Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Newark, 40 U.S.L.W. 2101 (D.
Ore., July 22, 1971). Contra Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756,
760-61 (7th Cir. 1973); Allen v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 361 F. Supp. 1212
(N.D. Texas 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 490 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1974).
The validity of the Chrisman ruling has been challenged legislatively by
congressional enactment of the Health Programs Extension Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300a-7(a) (2) (1974). The intent of the act is to prevent a federal court
from finding a private or religious hospital subject to federal jurisdiction
under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by the mere fact that the facility has received federal
construction funds. In effect, the act states that a facility receiving such
funds may not be required ipso facto to provide facilities or staff for
sterilization or abortion operations when such operations are contrary to
the established policy of the facility opposing sterilization or abortion.
For a legislative background to this hastily drawn act see 1973 U.S. Code
Cong. & Adm. News 1553. The constitutional validity of this Act has as
yet been affirmed only on the district court level. See Taylor v. St.
Vincent's Hospital, 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973); see also Greco v.
Orange Memorial Hosp., 374 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Texas 1974); Watkins v.
Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho 1973).
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What Hathaway 'does provide is that a governmental general
hospital may not refuse use of its premises for procedures it has
the capacity and opportunity to perform as demonstrated by its
actual medical practices and the availability of its facilities. Thus,
this decision, by analogy, can be applied to other requested procedures in addition to voluntary sterilization, for example, legal
abortion. Hathaway in effect removes a potential obstacle that
could render worthless the right of a woman to decide whether or
not to continue her pregnancy as recognized in Roe and Doe. This
obstacle, the denial of facilities by a public hospital, would be especially apparent when the hospital represented the only financially
accessible institution open to the patient.
Furthermore, the scope of Hathaway, both as to the remedies
available and the type of defendant liable in such a suit, has been
expanded. Although plaintiff's remedy in Hathaway was limited
to declaratory and injunctive relief, recent federal cases" indicate
that a tort claim for damages may also be available to a party suing
because of the denial of facilities for voluntary sterilization. Indeed, the damage claim may stand alone as the only relief sought
by the plaintiff. With respect to the question of who may be liable
as a defendant, one case has held that a private hospital can be
sued for failure to make its facilities available in factual situations
70
analogous to Hathaway.
In sum, several broad propositions emerge from the court of
appeals decision in Hathaway. First, policy decisions by a municipal hospital concerning permissible use of its facilities are not immune to judicial review in federal court merely because the hospital
acted under discretionary authority. Secondly, the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection requires that a party's request for use
of facilities for a particular operation be treated by the hospital in a
manner reasonably related to the hospital's legislated purpose.
Thirdly, the constitutional right of privacy recognized in Roe v.
Wade,' and Doe v. Bolton 72 includes a woman's decision to terminate
her reproductive capacity, regardless of her lack of therapeutic in-

69. McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.
1971); Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Newark, 40 U.S.L.W. 2101 (D.
Ore., July 22, 1971). See note 65 supra.
70. Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Newark, 40 U.S.L.W. 2101 (D.
Ore., July 22, 1971). See note 68 supra.
71. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72.

410 U.S. 179 (1973).

tent. Finally, there exists no compelling state interest per se that
73
outweighs a woman's decision to be sterilized.
J. A. ALZA-moRA

73. This last proposition would logically apply to any party seeking
voluntary sterilization, whether male or female, married or single.

CRIMINAL LAW-PROBATION REVOCATION: PRETRIAL REVOCATION AND DUE PROCESS

Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973)
In Commonwealth v. Kates,1 the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-

vania, in a case of first impression ruled on: (1) the propriety of
conducting probation violation hearings prior to a criminal trial
where the alleged violation consists of the same activities which are
the basis for the criminal charges, 2 and (2) the necessity of due
process requirements in probation violation hearings. Justice Nix,
speaking for the majority,3 ruled against the defendant on both issues. The court held that the practice of conducting probation revvocation hearings prior to a criminal trial for the same offense
was constitutionally allowable, and that there were no overriding
public policy considerations prohibiting the practice. 4 Moreover,
the court, after establishing due process guidelines, ruled that at
these hearings the admission of confessions obtained in violation of
the Miranda5 mandatesO is not a denial of due process. 7
1. 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973).
2. Lower courts in Pennsylvania have spoken to the issue; however,
their position is ambiguous. In Commonwealth v. Duff, 201 Pa. Super.
387, 192 A.2d 258, rev'd on other grounds, 414 Pa. 471, 200 A.2d 773 (1964),
the court assumed without deciding that it was necessary to await a conviction before the revocation of probation hearing. But in Commonwealth
ex rel. Milk v. Maroney, 198 Pa. Super. 442, 181 A.2d 702 (1962), the court
held that conviction was not necessary prior to revocation of probation.
Typical is Commonwealth v. Kibler, 33 LEH. L.J. 307 (1969) where the
court continued the revocation hearing pending criminal trial, but noted
in dictum that it was not necessary to await conviction of a crime or that
violation of probation be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Justice Nix announced the judgment of the court and an opinion
in which Chief Justice Jones, Justice Eagen, Justice O'Brien, and Justice
Pomeroy join. Justice Roberts filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.
Justice Manderino dissented.
4. Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 114-15, 305 A.2d 701, 708
(1973). Other state and federal courts have generally upheld the practice
of conducting probation violation hearings prior to criminal trials arising
from the same activities as the alleged violation. See, e.g., United States
v. Chambers, 429 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Markovich, 348
F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Feller, 156 F. Supp. 107 (D.
Alaska 1957); Borges v. States, 249 So. 2d 513 (Fla. App. 1971); People
v. Smith, 105 Ill. App. 2d 14, 245 N.E.2d 13 (1969); Davis v. State, - Ind.
-,
267 N.E.2d 63 (1971); State v. Patterson, 3 Or. App. 480, 475 P.2d 91
(1970); Flint v. Howard, -- R.I. -,

291 A.2d 625 (1972).

5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person shall ...

be com-

pelled to in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . .

."

In

These two novel issues were raised by Commonwealth v Kates8
and two companion casesY The three cases were consolidated under the name of Commonwealth v. Kates,10 for review by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In each case the appellants had
previously been convicted of crimes and probation had beeen
granted after sentence was suspended. Each appellant during his
period of probation was subsequently arrested and charged with
a new crime. In the case of one appellant," the probation hearing
was postponed pending the outcome of the appeal discussed herein.
In the other two cases probation violation hearings were held preceding trial for the new offenses. Because of testimony at these
hearings describing activities which constituted the basis for the
pending criminal charges, probation was revoked and the suspended prison sentences for the original crimes were imposed.
Appellant Kates' probation was revoked primarily because of an incriminating statement attributed to Kates and admitted into evidence over her objection at the hearing. However, at the subsequent criminal trial this statement was suppressed 12 and Kates was
found not guilty.
The general practice in Pennsylvania has apparently been to
conduct the violation hearings prior to the criminal trial. 13 Probation is not a constitutional right, but is a privilege enforced at
the discretion of the states by statute. 4 The authority to grant
and revoke probation in Pennsylvania is derived from three statMiranda the Supreme Court developed the fifth amendment exclusionary
rule whereby inculpatory or exculpatory statements stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant are inadmissible unless proper procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination
were used. Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 121, 305 A.2d 701, 711
(1973).
8. Commonwealth v. Kates, Nos. 213, 214 (C.P., Trial Div. Crim. Sec.,
Phila. Co. Aug. 7, 1969).
9. Commonwealth v. McClellan, No. 54 (C.P. Trial Div.-Crim. Sec.,
Phila. Co. June 7, 1969), aff'd mem., 217 Pa. Super. 834, 270 A.2d 231
(1970); Allen v. Reed, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973) (petition for writ
of prohibition denied).
10. 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973).
11. Appellant Allen filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the hearing judge agreed to postpone
his violation hearing until after the court's decision on the writ.
12. The statement was obtained in violation of Miranda. See note
6 supra.
13. Due to the relatively few number of appellate cases dealing with
revocation of probation as a result of subsequent criminal charges, a definite practice is difficult to discern. That probation violation hearings were
routinely scheduled prior to trial in Kates and its two companion cases,
suggests such a practice. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex tel. Milk v. Maroney, 198 Pa. Super. 442, 181 A.2d 702 (1962); Commonwealth v. Fox,
69 Pa. Super. 456 (1918); Commonwealth v. Miller, 63 Pa. Super. 548
(1916).
14. See, e.g., Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492, 493 (1935); Burns v.
United States, 287 U.S. 216, 219, 220 (1932).
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utes. 15 Upon reviewing these statutes, the court discerned no statutory prohibition as to conducting a probation violation hearing
prior to the criminal trial when both emanate from the same
events.
The court next considered whether there are any constitutional guarantees violated by the practice of pretrial revocation.
The issue presented is whether the present practice creates a tension between two constitutional rights: the right against self-incrimination and the right of due process. 16 If the violation hearing
is held prior to the criminal trial, the probationer must choose between either testifying or remaining silent at the hearing. By testifying he risks the possibility of uttering self-incriminatory statements which could be used against him at the criminal trial. If,
however, he remains silent, he will not be able to fully defend himself against revocation of his probation. The appellants' argument
is that the unjustifiable tension created by this choice in effect
renders any self-incriminatory statements made by the individual
at his probation hearing non-voluntary.
To support their argument, the appellants relied heavily on
Simmons v. United States' 7 in which the Court discussed the creation of tension between two constitutional rights. In Simmons the
defendant was tried and convicted of robbing a bank. At a suppression hearing the defendant in order to establish standing to assert his fourth amendment right against the use of illegally obtained evidence, had to acknowledge ownership of a suitcase containing stolen money wrappers.
15. The earliest statutes are the Act of May 10, 1909, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 1081 (1964), and the Act of June 19, 1911, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 1051 (1964). The language in section 1051 is identical to that in section 1081. Section 1051 provides for the granting of probation as well as
the circumstances under which it is properly granted. Section 1055 of the
Act of 1911, provides for the arrest and revocation of probation in the event
the terms of probation are violated. The most recent act dealing with
probation is the Act of 1941, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 331.25 (1964), which
established the Pennsylvania Board of Parole. Only PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 1055 (1964) deals specifically with the procedure for revocation of
probation and it is silent with respect to pretrial revocation hearings:
Whenever a person placed on probation, as aforesaid, shall violate
the terms of his or her probation, he or she shall be subject to
arrest in the same manner as in the case of an escaped convict;
and shall be brought before the court which released him or her
on probation which court may thereupon pronounced upon such
defendant such sentence as may be prescribed by law, to begin
at such time as the court may direct.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1055 (1964).
16. Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 112, 305 A.2d 701, 707
(1973).
17. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).

This testimony was then used at the criminal trial to establish
an element of the crime which the government would otherwise
have had great difficulty in proving. The Court stated that:
Those courts which have allowed admission of testimony given to establish standing have reasoned that there
is no violation of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause because the testimony was voluntary. As an
abstract matter, this may well be true. A defendant is
'compelled' to testify in support of a motion to suppress
only in the sense that if he refrains from testifying he
will have to forgo a benefit, and testimony is not always
involuntary as a matter of law simply because it is given
to obtain a benefit. However, the assumption which underlies this reasoning is that the defendant has a choice.
He may refuse to testify and give up the benefit. When
this assumption is applied to a situation in which the
'benefit' to be gained is that afforded by another provision
18
of the Bill of Rights, an undeniable tension is created.
The court in Simmons concluded that it violates a defendant's constitutional rights to use testimony given at a suppression hearing to
establish the issue of guilt at the subsequent trial.19 Appellants relying on Simmons analogized that the practice of holding the hearing prior to trial should be prohibited on the grounds that an "unjustifiable tension" between constitutional rights was created.
In Melson v. Sard20 the court addressed itself to the same issue
as Kates and reached the same ultimate result. In Melson the defendant appealed an order denying his petition for declaratory relief and for enjoinment of revocation proceedings pending the outcome of his appeal. He contended, like appellants in Kates, that
he would be denied due process of the law if a revocation hearing
was held prior to his trial. The court in Melson sympathized with
the dilemma confronting the defendant as evidenced by its statement that "any self-incriminatory statements made by an individual in order to protect his basic interests are far from voluntarily
made."'2' The court sought a different solution from that of staying the revocation hearing until after the criminal trial, feeling
that "[t]he solution lies in establishing safeguards by which the
parolee's dilemma is lessened at the revocation hearing." 22 In an
effort to provide such safeguards the Melson court held that "any
self-incriminatory statements made in a parole revocation hearing
shall not be used affirmatively against the parolee in any subsequent criminal proceeding. ' 2 The court did not however hold
pre-trial revocation hearings improper.
Justice Nix in Kates, would not go as far as the Mel18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
402
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 393-94.
at 394.
F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
at 655.
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son court, He rejected the analogy between Kates and Simmons noting that in Simmons the defendant testified at the suppression hearing, and that this incriminating testimony was used
against him at the subsequent trial.24 In Kates, however, since
none of the appellants had testified at their revocation hearings,
there were no incriminatory statements to be used against them.
The holding is limited to situations in which the defendant has not
testified in the pretrial proceeding by the court's refusal to "speculate as to what may have occurred had appellants elected to testify and their testimony was introduced against them at the subsequent proceeding. '25 The thrust of Justice Nix's argument is that
there is no unjustifiable tension demonstrated in the specific facts
presented in the Kates' appeal, and therefore, appellants have
no constitutional objections to their pretrial revocation.
In support of his conclusion, Justice Nix cited McGautha v.
California6 in which the soundness of the reasoning in Simmons,
but not the result was questioned.27 The due process concept of
Simmons, the McGautha court emphasized, was not afforded by
the Constitution merely because an accused was faced with a difficult choice in deciding to invoke his fifth amendment protection.
The Court reasoned that:
The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is
replete with situations requiring 'the making of difficult
judgments' as to which course to follow. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, at 769 (1970). Although a defendant
may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not
by that token always forbid requiring him to choose. The
threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable
extent any of the policies behind
28
the rights involved.
The Court in McGautha thereby limited the scope of the reasoning
in Simmons to a situation where the accused would be required to
waive one constitutional guarantee in order to invoke another. 29
24.
(1973).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 113, 305 A.2d 701, 707
Id.
402 U.S. 183 (1971).
Id.at 212.
Id. at 212-13.
The A.B.A. committee on probation issued its report, ABA PaoJ

ECT ON STANDARDS

FOR

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE:

PROBATION

(Approved

Draft

1970), which proposes yet another solution as a minimum standard. The
report states:
Proceedings following commission of another crime: A revocation proceeding based solely upon the Commission of another
crime ordinarily should not be initiated prior to the disposition

The Kates court concluded that the appellants were not placed in
such a position and therefore ruled against them.
Considering the validity of pretrial revocations in light of
public policy, the court had little trouble concluding that policy
permits and even encourages such a practice. Two arguments
were considered. Appellants urged that policy dictates that revocation hearings be delayed until after the criminal trial to conserve
judicial time and manpower reasoning that if the probationer was
found not guilty at the criminal trial there would be no grounds
for revoking his probation and therefore no need to hold the hearing.30 The second argument was presented by Justice Manderino
in his dissenting opinion 1 There he argued vigorously that no
penalty of any kind including revocation of probation, can be imposed upon the accused until the completion of the criminal trial
on the grounds that, "a person is presumed innocent of criminal
'3 2
conduct until proven guilty in a criminal trial.
Both arguments rest on the presumption that .the same standard of proof exists at the revocation hearing as exists at criminal
trials. No probation statute specifies the degree of proof necessary to prove a violation.33 Courts differ as to what standard
should be used, but the most common judicial formulation is "evidence which reasonably satisfies the judge.' '3 4 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required, 35 and numerous state and federal
cases have upheld this distinction and do not require a criminal conviction before probation can be revoked.36 Typical of the cases reof that charge. However, upon a showing of probable cause that

another crime has been committed by the probationer, the probation court should have discretionary authority to detain the probationer without bail pending a determination of the new criminal
charge.
Id. at 62, 63 (emphasis added).
30. Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 114, 305 A.2d 701, 708
(1973).
31. Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 126, 305 A.2d 701, 713 (Manderino, J., dissenting 1973).
32. Id.
33. Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 COLUM. L. REv.
311, 332 (1959).
34. See, e.g., United States v. D'Amato, 429 F.2d 1284 (3d Cir. 1970)
(district judge need only be reasonably satisfied); Manning v. United
States, 161 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1947) (evidence such as to reasonably satisfy
the judge); Blaylock v. State, 88 Ga. 880, 78 S.E.2d 537 (1953) (sufficient
to satisfy the judge); see Comment, Discretionary Power and Procedural
Rights in the Granting and Revoking of Probation,60 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S.
479, 488 (1969).
35. See, e.g., Manning v. United States, 161 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1947);
Allen v. State, 78 Ga. App. 526, 51 S.E.2d 571 (1949).; Marshall v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 217, 116 S.E.2d 270 (1960).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Chambers, 429 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1970);
United States v. D'Amato, 429 F.2d 1284 (3d Cir. 1970); United States ex
rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. La. 1970); Borges v. State,
249 So. 2d 513 (Fla. App. 1971); People v. Smith, 105 Ill. App. 2d 14, 245
N.E.2d 13 (1969); Davis v. State, -mInd. -, 267 N.E.2d 63 (1971); State
v. Patterson, 3 Or. App. 480, 475 P.2d 91 (1970); Commonwealth ex rel.
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7
lied on by Justice Nix is United States v. Chambers."
There
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that probation may be revoked on the basis of conduct which falls short of criminal conduct, and the fact that the accused is acquitted of the criminal
charges does not remove all factual support for a revocation of
probation made while state charges were still pending.38
Not only do the standards of proof differ in the two proceedings, but more importantly, the focus of each differs. In the statutes authorizing the granting of probation,39 the Pennsylvania legislature recognized the propriety of a court granting probation
where the defendant is not likely to engage in a course of "criminal
conduct" or "offensive conduct" and the public good does not demand that the defendant should suffer the penalty imposed by
law. 40 The court's focus in a revocation hearing is directed at
weighing the benefit to be gained from probation by both society
and the probationer, against the endangerment of the public welfare from the risk of future criminal conduct by the probationer.
This balancing process, Justice Nix reasoned, is the issue presented
for consideration-not whether the elements of the offense charged
against the.-probationer have been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.41 Therefore, the opinion holds that:
[T]he focus of a probation violation hearing, even though
prompted by a subsequent arrest, is whether the conduct
of the probationer indicates that probation has proven to
be an effective vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and
a sufficient deterrent against future antisocial conduct
42

Considering the different burdens of proof as well as the different
Milk v. Maroney, 198 Pa. Super. 442, 181 A.2d702 (1962); Flint v. Howard,
-R.I.-, 291 A.2d 625 (1972).
37. 429 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1970); accord, Borges v. State, 249 So. 2d
513 (Fla. App. 1971); Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 208 A.2d 575 (1965);
Marshall v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 217, 116 S.E.2d 270 (1960).
38. United States v. Chambers, 429 F.2d 410, 411 (3d Cir. 1970).
39. 'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 331.25 (1964) provides in part:

. . [T]he court shall have the power in its discretion, if it believes the character of the person and the circumstances of the
case to be such that he is not likely again to engage in a course
of criminal conduct and that the public good does not demand or
require the imposition of a sentence to imprisonment.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1051 (1964) provides in part:

[W]here the said court believes that the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the case such that he or she is
not likely again to engage in an offensive course of conduct, and
the public good does not demand or require that the defendant
should suffer the penalty imposed by law. ...
40.

41.
(1973).

See note 39 supra.

Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 114-15, 305 A.2d 701, 708

42. Id.

focus of the proceedings, the court concluded that it is not
necessary to postpone probation revocation hearings until the pro43
bationer is tried and convicted of the alleged crime.
Having established the propriety of pretrial revocation hearings, the Pennsylvasia Supreme Court next considered whether appellant's due process rights were violated. A brief review of cases
discussing the due process rights of probationers at revocation
hearings demonstrates the second class status of probationers with
regard to such rights. The probationer's status, conditional liberty after being convicted of a crime, has often been distinguished
from that of one who is merely accused of a crime as a basis for denying probationers constitutional safeguards. 44 The courts reason
that revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions and,
therefore, constitutional guarantees are not applicable. Justice
45
Cardozo reached this conclusion when he stated in Escoe v. Zerbst

that "[p] robation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace
to one convicted of a crime and may be coupled with such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose. '4 Granting probation as an act of grace rather than a right has resulted in
a right-privilege distinction.41 On this basis courts concluded that
the status of probation, being one of privilege, is circumscribed
only by those procedural rights provided by the state in its statutes. 48 Several state and federal courts cited the "Escoe Doctrine" to deny procedural due process requirements to probationers
49
at revocation hearings.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932); Hyser v.
Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1968). See
generally Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty,
12 WAYNE L. REV. 638 (1966).
45. 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
46. Id. at 492, 493 (dictum).
47. Other theories have been proposed by courts to deny constitutional rights to probationers at revocation hearings: (1) Contract theory:
see, e.g., Johnson v. Walls, 155 Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937); (2) Constructive Custody theory: see, e.g., Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1962).
For a more extensive and critical discussion of these various theories see
Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE
L. REv. 638 (1966).
48. See note 44 supra. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 19, § 1055 (1964) provides
in part: "Whenever a person placed on probation shall violate the terms
of his or her probation, he or she . . .shall be brought before the court.
." (emphasis added). The leading case construing the phrase "brought
before the court" as direction that some kind of hearing be held is Escoe
v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935). Pennsylvania has followed the practice
of allowing a probation violation hearing of some kind. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Remeriez v. Maroney, 415 Pa. 534, 204 A.2d 450 (1984);
Commonwealth v. Duff, 201 Pa. Super. 387, 192 A.2d 258 (1963); Commonwealth v. Fox, 69 Pa. Super. 456 (1918).
49. See, e.g., Linton v. Cox, 358 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1966) (state probation proceeding need not fit procedural due process requirements of federal constitution); United States v. Markovich, 348 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1965)
(criminal conviction not prerequisite for probation revocation); United
States v. Ilollien, 105 F. Supp. 987 (W.D. Mich. 1952) (probationer has
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Whereas courts have traditionally not found a constitutional
right of due process applicable to probationers, they appear to
have recognized a distinction between procedural and substantive
due process. 50

Some courts, although not granting procedural

due process rights to probationers, have implicitly recognized a
substantive due process right by holding that revocation decisions
must not be arbitrary or based on the mere whim or caprice of the
revoking authority.5 1 Recently courts have begun to recognize procedural due process requirements applicable to probation revoca52
tion proceedings apart from those found in statutes.
When faced with this issue in Kates, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the due process requirements enumerated in
Morrissey v. Brewer.53 In Morrissey the United States Supreme
Court dealing with parole revocation hearings stated that:
Our task is limited to deciding the minimum requirements
of due process. They include (a) written notice of the
claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee
of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good
cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and
detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board,
members of which need not be judicial officers of lawyers;
and (f) a written statement by the fact-finders as
54 to the
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
The Kates decision makes these requirements applicable to probation revocation hearings in Pennsylvania.5 5 However, while Morno right to a speedy and public trial); McNeely v. State, 186 S.2d 520
(Fla. App. 1966) (strict rules of evidence not required at probation revocation proceeding). Contra, Joyce v. Strassheim, 242 Ill. 359, 90 N.E. 118
(1909) ; State v. Zolantkis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 (1927).
50. See generally Annot., 29 A.LR.2d 1077, 1078 (1953).
51. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 223 (1932); United States
v. D'Amato, 429 F.2d 1284, 1286 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Feller,
156 F. Supp. 107, 110 (D. Alaska 1957).
52. See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel
at probation revocation hearing); Halin v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir.
1970) (right to hearing upon probation revocation); Commonwealth ex rel.
Remierz v. Maroney, 415 Pa. 534, 204 A.2d 450 (1964) (right to counsel
at revocation hearing).
53. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
54. Id. at 488.
55. 452 Pa. 102, 118 n.10, 305 A.2d 701, 709 n.10 (1973) when the court
noted:
[W]e believe that Morrissey v. Brewer, supra is applicable
to probation revocations as well as parole revocations and thus
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the state afford an individual some opportunity to be heard
prior to a revocation order.

rissey recognizes certain basic procedural rights such as notice,
hearing, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, the
court expressly refrained from equating a probationer's due process rights with those of an accused in a criminal prosecution.
Maintaining this distinction, the Kates court quotes Morrissey6
saying that, "there is no thought to equate this second stage of
parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense . . . .
Adopting the due process requirements of Morrissey, did not
resolve the final issue raised by appellant Kates. She contended
a statement made by her was improperly admitted into evidence at
her revocation hearing. 58 This contention was based on the fact
that the statement was ruled inadmissible, as having been obtained in violation of the Miranda mandates,"9 at her subsequent
criminal trial. Therefore, Kates argued, the fifth amendment
exclusionary rule militates against such evidence being used at either her criminal trial or her probation revocation hearing.
Two conflicting views are considered in Kates with regard to
the applicability of the exclusionary rule to evidence presented at
revocation hearings. The dissent, arguing with the appellant, contends that evidence obtained in violation of the fifth amendment
could not be used in any capacity.6 0 In support of this contention
the dissent quotes Wong Sun v. United States61 which states "con'62
stitutionally, illegally obtained evidence shall not be used at all."
The majority was not convinced by this reasoning and follows another line of cases6 3 to a different conclusion. Representative of
this line of cases is United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd.64
The Heyd court held that:
Expansion of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation
hearings would in all likelihood further its laudable purpose of deterring unconstitutional methods of law enforcement. But the good to be obtained from such expansion
must be balanced against the harm which will result due
to the unique nature and purpose of the probation revocation hearing. If the rehabilitative function of the probation system is to be fostered, it seems imperative that the
56. 452 Pa. at 118, 305 A.2d at 709 (1973).
57. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972).
58. 452 Pa. 102, 121, 305 A.2d 701, 711 (1973).
59. 348 U.S. 436 (1966). See note 6 supra.
60. 452 Pa. 102, 125, 305 A.2d 701, 713 (1973). The dissent also relied
on Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (evidence obtained in violation
of Miranda could not be used by prosecution in its cases in chief), and Michaund v. Oklahoma, 505 P.2d 1399 (Okla. 1973) (evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment could not be used at a probation hearing).
61. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
62. Id. at 485.
63. United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1970); United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648 (E.D.
La. 1970); In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734
(1970). See also United States v. Bryant, 431 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
64. 318 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. La. 1970).
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judge charged with the responsibility and discretion to
grant or deny or revoke probation be fully aware of all
the facts and cricumstances in a particular case.0 5
The Kates court weighed the policy consideration behind the exclusionary rule, i.e., deterrence of unconstitutional methods of law
enforcement, against the need for all available probative evidence
at the revocation hearing. The majority found the latter need
more compelling. Justice Nix, speaking for the majority, wrote:
In this area of rights of probationers and parolees the
controlling factor is not whether the traditional rules of
evidence or procedure including Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules, have been strictly observed, but
rather whether the probative value of the evidence has
been affected .... 00

Therefore, so long as the statement was not involuntary or coerced,
it thus retained its probative value and would be admissible at the
revocation hearing. Appellant Kates objected only to improper
Miranda warnings being given and offered no proof that the statement was involuntary in a sense that would destroy its probative
value. The majority concluded that "this type of constitutional
objection does not preclude the evidence from being presented during a probation revocation hearing and does not form the basis of
a denial of due process."0 7
The significance of Kates is that it is the first case in which
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considers the constitutionality of
holding probation revocation hearings prior to trial and the due
process requirements of such hearings. The Kates court adopted
68
the due process standards delineated in Morrisey v. Brewer,
thereby granting probationers certain basic procedural rights, such
as notice, hearing, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses at their revocation hearing. However, the court refused
to apply the fifth amendment exclusionary rule to such hearings
unless the evidence was lacking probative value due to its involuntary nature. The Kates ruling provides precise working guidelines which Pennsylvania courts must now follow in conducting
probation and parole revocation hearings. Unfortunately there
was no such definitive ruling on the constitutionality of pretrial
revocation hearings in Pennsylvania. The court found that no ten65. Id. at 651; accord, United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick,
426 F.2d
66.
67.
68.
pra.

116
452
452
408

(2d Cir. 1970).
Pa. 102, 118-19, 305 A.2d 701, 710 (1973).
Pa. at 121, 305 A.2d at 711.
U.S. 471 (1972). See notes 55-57 and accompanying text su-

sion between two constitutional rights69 existed in the facts on appeal because the appellants had not testified at their revocation
hearings to protect their due process rights.7 0 Therefore, since no
incriminating statements from the revocation hearing were admitted against them at their criminal trial, their right against self-incrimination was not violated by the pretrial revocation proceeding.
However, the court refused to speculate as to the outcome had
such revocation hearing statements been made and used at the subsequent criminal trial thereby creating tension between the right of
due process and the right against self-incrimination. 71 This question is left open in Kates and can only be answered by further litigation or legislation.
P. CLARKSON COLL INS, JR.

69.
70.
71.
(1973).

See note 16 and
See note 24 and
Commonwealth
See note 25 and

accompanying text supra.
accompanying text supra.
v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 113, 305 A.2d 701,
accompanying text supra.
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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF DECLARATIONS
AGAINST PENAL INTEREST

Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. 22,

307 A.2d 334 (1973)
The court in Commonwealth v. Hackett1 held that the exclusion of a third party's confession to the crime with which the defendant was charged was a denial of the defendant's due process
rights. 2 This decision changes the course of evidentiary law in
Pennsylvania as it renders declarations against penal interest mandatorily admissible under certain circumstances 3 and incorporates
the concept of due process as the basic pillar or reasoning uphold4
ing such a decision.
In Hackett, the defendant was convicted of possession of heroin
and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs. 5 In
his defense, the appellant argued that he was involuntarily drugged
through the consumption of a "fixed" soda that was given to him
by one Dennis Keyser. In order to prove this contention, the
appellant sought to have Dennis Keyser testify. However, on the
authority of Commonwealth v. Green,6 it was determined in camera
1. 225 Pa. Super. 22, 307 A.2d 334 (1973).

2. Id. at 29, 307 A.2d at 338.
3. Compare Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. 22, 307 A.2d
334 (1973) with Commonwealth v. Somershoe, 217 Pa. Super. 156, 269 A.2d
149 (1970) and Commonwealth v. Honigman, 216 Pa. Super. 303, 264 A.2d
424 (1970), in which it was affirmed that declarations against penal interest
were inadmissible as hearsay.
4. Compare Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. 22, 307 A.2d
334 (1973) with, e.g., Salvitti v. Throppe, 343 Pa. 642, 23 A.2d 445 (1942),
in which a declaration against pecuniary interest was held admissible simply because it falls within a traditional rule, and Rudisill v. Cordes, 333
Pa. 544, 5 A.2d 217 (1939), in which a declaration against pecuniary interest
was held to be admissible because of its probative value alone.
5. In the early hours of November 13, 1971, Officer McCallion of the
Lansdale police found James Patrick Hackett unconscious at the wheel of
his car with the motor running, the headlights on and the automobile's
wheels partially on the sidewalk. Inside the car was an empty vial, a tourniquet, and an empty syringe. Fresh blood was on the front seat. The
appellant was immediately taken to North Penn Hospital to be treated for
a suspected drug overdose and then to the police station where it was found,
through urine analysis, that heroin was in his system.
6. 445 Pa. 228, 285 A.2d 865 (1971), in which the defendant attempted
to have one Earl Williams, who was charged with the same crimes as the
defendant, appear on the witness stand and plead the fifth amendment
guarantees against self-incrimination so as to inferentially benefit the de-

that Keyser would be unavailable as a witness because he would
refuse to answer questions concerning the crime on the constitutional ground that to do so would incriminate him. The appellant
then offered testimony that Keyser orally admitted to one McNamee that he "fixed" the appellant by putting heroin in the soda
bottle. This testimony was successfully objected to and excluded
from evidence. Likewise, a written declaration 'by Keyser describing the incident of fixing the appellant was excluded from evidence.
Both times the evidence was excluded on the ground that it was
hearsay7 failing to fall within any exception to the exclusionary
rule.8 On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court committed reversible error in excluding such exculpatory evidence during the trial.9 The superior court agreed and held that in this case
the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule
must be adopted.' 0
The true import of the decision reached in Hackett can best be
gleaned by an examination of the historical course of the law of
hearsay and the declaration against interest exception. In general,
hearsay is inadmissible."' Various reasons have been given for its
exclusion. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the court in Queen
v. Hepburn,1" argued that it is extrinsically weak, incompetent to
satisfy the mind of the existence of the fact and a vehicle for
fraud."3 Professor Wigmore viewed hearsay as a source of error
and untrustworthiness.1 4 However, under certain factual situations
such as where there is a high probability that the evidence is trustfendant in the eyes of the jury. In affirming the trial court's prohibition
of this tactic, the appellate court stated:
Reviewing the prindiple that the jury may not draw any inference
from a witness' exercise of his constitutional rights whether the
inference be favorable to the prosecution or the defense, the [trial]
court, applying the corollary of this rule, declared that a witness
should not be placed on the stand for the purpose of having him
exercise his privilege before the jury.
Id. at 231, 285 A.2d at 867. Accord, Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536,
541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1970).
7. Hearsay evidence is defined as:
[Tjestimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made
out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show
the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value
upon the credibility of the out of court asserter.
C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]. See also 5 J. WIOMOE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1361 (3d ed. 1940)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. Consistently, hearsay has been held inadmissible. See MCCORMICK § 224; 5 WIGMORE § 1364.
8. There are numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule. McCormick
lists dying declarations, declarations against interest, statements of pedigree
and family history, and former testimony as the usual exceptions. See, e.g.,
MCCORMICK § 254-324; 5 WIoMORE § 1420.
9. 225 Pa. Super. at 24, 307 A.2d at 335.
10. Id. at 30, 307 A.2d at 338.
11. E.g., MCCORMICK § 244; 5 WcMORE § 1364.

12. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813).

13.
14.

Id. at 295.
5 WimoMoa § 1362,
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worthy and there is necessity to resort to such evidence, the reasons supporting the hearsay rule become invalid and render the
use of the hearsay rule irrational. 15 Historically, the declaration
against interest exception to the hearsay rule qualified as such a
situation because the courts considered it unlikely that an individual would make a statement adverse to his interest unless
it was true, thereby rendering it highly trustworthy, 6 and because
the courts further required that the declarant be dead, 17 insane, 18 or physically incapacitated, 19 thereby necessitating the
use of such evidence. Furthermore, to insure the avoidance of the
pitfalls enumerated by Marshall and Wigmore, many jurisdictions
20
required that the facts stated be within the declarant's knowledge
or that there be no ascertainable motive on the part of the declarant to falsify his statement.2 1 Moreover, the most universally accepted safeguard has been to limit the exception to declarations
22
against pecuniary interest.
15. 5 WiMOmE § 1420.
16. E.g., Public Utilities Corp. v. Carden, 182 Ark. 858, 861, 32 S.W.2d
1058, 1059 (1930); Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 175 Iowa 358, 384,
151 N.W. 852, 861 (1915); Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 294, 189 S.W.2d
284, 289 (1945).
17. E.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 275 (1913); Wirthlin
v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 56 F.2d 137, 140 (10th Cir. 1932); McDonald v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 150 Mont. 332, 335-36, 435 P.2d 369, 371 (1967).
18. E.g., Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 175 Iowa 358, 382, 151 N.W.
852, 863 (1915); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 134 S.W.2d
470, 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1939).
19. Griffith v. Sauls, 77 Tex. 630, 633-34, 14 S.W. 230, 231 (1890).
20. E.g., Filesi v. United States, 352 F.2d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 1965);
Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 175 Iowa 358, 382, 151 N.W. 852, 863
(1915); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strauch, 179 Okla. 617, 620, 67 P.2d 452, 454
(1937).
21. E.g., Weber v. Chicago, R.I .& P.R. Co., 175 Iowa 358, 383, 151 N.W.
852, 864 (1915).
See Evans v. Independent Nat. L. Ins. Co., 148 So. 264
(La. App. 1933).
22. E.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); Smith v. State,
9 Ala. 990 (1846); Tillman v. State, 112 Ark. 236, 166 S.W. 582 (1914); Lyon
v. State, 22 Ga. 399 (1857); Bansall v. State, 35 Ind. 400 (1871); State v.
Smith, 35 Kan. 618, 11 P. 908 (1886); Cloud v. Commonwealth, 7 Ky. L.
Rep. 818 (1886); State v. West, 45 La. Ann. 14, 12 So. 7 (1893); Munshower
v. State, 55 Md. 11, 39 Am. R. 414 (1880); Helm v. State, 67 Mass. 562, 7
So. 487 (1890); State v. Evans, 55 Mo. 460 (1874); Mays v. State, 72 Neb.
723, 101 N.W. 979 (1904); State v. Gonzales, 19 N.M. 467, 144 P. 1144 (1914);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strauch, 179 Okla. 617, 67 P.2d 452 (1937); State v.
Totten, 72 Vt. 73, 47 A. 105 (1899); State v. Hunta, 18 Wash. 670, 52 P. 247
(1898). This development was triggered by the holding of an English case
decided in the House of Lords in 1844, The Sussex Peerage, 11 Clark and
Finnilly 85, 111, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1045 (1844), which grew out of two lines
of cases. By this time it had become common to receive into evidence, as an
exception to the hearsay rule, the account entries of a deceased person or
the entries in a vicar's title-book. Concomitant to this development was

Regardless of which other limitations they do recognize, the
majority of jurisdictions do not admit declarations against penal
interest. These jurisdictions rationalize their position on one or
more of several theories. It has been held that statements adverse
to one's penal interest, unlike similar statements against one's
pecuniary interest, do not establish the trustworthiness required
to trigger the exception.23 The Supreme Court of the United States
has held that the rationale of the hearsay rule and the dangers it
guards against are sufficient to preclude the adoption of exceptions
to the general rule.24 The Supreme Court of Mississippi has ruled
that wrongful motives would often spur the confession of a crime
by an innocent party.2

5

Similarly, it has been argued that a relaxa:

tion of the exclusionary rule would open the flood gates to perjured testimony.

26

On the other hand, several jurisdictions have relaxed the exclusionary rule and admit such a declaration if it: (1) is shown by
the circumstances surrounding the case that the declaration is highly
trustworthy;27 (2) meets certain tests intended to assure its reliability;28 (3) is to be used in a case based solely upon circumstanthe practice of admitting declarations in disparagement of one's property

title. Thus, the declaration against interest exception came to fruition in
cases specifically involving declarations against pecuniary and proprietory
interests.

5 WirMoas § 1476.

23. United States v. Mulholland, 50 F. 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1892).
24. Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 295 (1813).
25. Brown v. State, 99 Miss. 719, 55 So. 961, 962 (1911), in which the
declarant was the brother of the defendant being tried for murder and the
court believed that the declarant was motivated by a desire to free his
brother rather than a compulsion of guilt.
26. Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 172 A.2d 167, 170 (1961); Brennan v.
State, 151 Md. 265, 272, 134 A. 148, 150 (1926), in which the court recited
that "[everyone] accused of crime would be tempted to introduce perjured
testimony concerning statements of some third person, then beyond the jurisdiction of the court, admitting that such third person and not the defendant, had committed the crime in question. . .

."

In Chambers v. Miss., 410

U.S. 284, 301, n.21, the state posited the following hypothetical case:
If the rule were changed, A could be charged with the crime, B
could tell C and D that he had committed the crime; B could go
into hiding and at A's trial C and D would testify as to B's admission of guilt; A could be acquitted and B would return to stand
trial; B could then provide several witnesses to testify as to his
whereabouts at the time of the crime. The testimony of those witnesses along with A's statement that he really committed the crime
would result in B's acquittal. A would be barred from further
prosecution because of the protection against double jeopardy. No
one could be convicted of perjury as A did not testify at his trial,
B did not lie under oath, and C and D were truthful in their testi-

mony.
27. Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 272, 134 A. 148, 150 (1926), in which
it was held that a declaration of the commission of adultery, followed by
the declarant committing suicide, had been an "unusual circumstance . . .
safeguarding it against the dangers of fraud and perjury ... " Id. at 272,
134 A. at 150.
28. People v. Riccandi, 73 Misc. 2d 19, 340 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998-99 (1972),
in which it was held that,
in order that a declaration against oenal interest be received in
evidence, it must appear (1) that the declarant is dead, beyond
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tial evidence.29 The arguments relied on by these jurisdictions are
numerous. It has been argued that there is no reason for making
a distinction between declarations against penal interest and declarations against pecuniary interest,3 0 that no statement is more
strongly against interest than that adverse to one's penal interest,81
that such a limitation is inconsistent with the broad language originally employed in stating the reason and principle of the present
exception,3 2 and that a declaration against one's penal interest will
adversely affect one's pecuniary interest, and thus should be admissible.33 The opposing rationales causing the split of authority
seem to be based upon a difference of opinion as to whether or not
the threat of criminal prosecution is sufficient to preclude an individual from making an untruthful statement against his penal interest.
The decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court to modify the
then existing rule that a declaration against penal interest was inadmissible was based upon two considerations: first, the traditional
arguments that declarations against penal interest should be admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule; and, second, the constitutional considerations of providing a criminal defendant with a fair trial. The effect of the first force is evident
in the court's partial reliance and approval of the traditional argu34
ments used by the California Supreme Court in People v. Spriggs,
in which it was held that "a declaration against penal interest is no
less trustworthy [than a declaration against pecuniary interest]"
and that a "person's interest against being criminally implicated
gives reasonable assurance of the veracity of his statement made
the jurisdiction of the court and not available, or where he is in
the court he refuses to testify to the fact of the admission on the
ground of self-incrimination; (2) that the declaration when made
was against the penal interest of the declarant; (3) that the declarant had competent knowledge of the facts; and (4) that there
were no probable motives to misrepresent the facts. In a criminal
case there is a fifth requisite: there must be other evidence in the
case establishing the existence of the declarant and connecting him
with the commission of the crime.
In State v. Larson, 91 Idaho 42, 49, 415 P.2d 685, 692 (1966), the court held
that "third-party confessions, made out of the court are admissible only
when there is other substantial evidence which tends to show that the declarant is in fact the person guilty of the crime for which the accused is
on trial .. "
29. Wise v. State, 101 Tex. Crim. 58, 62, 273 S.W. 850 (1925).
30. Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 744, 117 S.E. 843, 847 (1923).
31. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S 243, 277 (1913) (dissenting
opinion).
32. 5 WIGMORE § 1477.
33. People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 870, 389 P.2d 377, 381, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 841, 845 (1964).
34. 60 Cal. 2d 868, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 389 P.2d 377 (1964).

against that interest." 35 This is further evidenced by the court's
reliance on the arguments used in the dissent to Commonwealth v.
Honigman36 in which Judge Hoffman argued that:
[A] distinction which would allow the admission of declarations against insignificant, insubstantial pecuniary interests
while excluding declarations which bear the potential of
serious penal punishment,
8 7 would appear to be untenable and
without logical support.
The effect of the second force-the due process considerationis cognizable by virtue of the fact that the court in this case relied
upon and quoted from the constitutional arguments set forth in
Chambers v. Mississippi." In Chambers, the United States Supreme Court ruled that in the particular circumstances of the case,
the defendant was deprived of the constitutionally guaranteed right
of due process by the trial court's mechanistic application of the
hearsay rule.8 9 The Court reasoned that certain rules of evidence,
adopted because of their great probability of insuring fairness and
40
Thus, it is
reliability, fall within the purview of due process.
constitutionally mandated that evidence which is rationally trustworthy by its nature and is reliable because of the extrinsic circumstances of the case be admitted. In Hackett, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court adopted this reasoning by holding that " [i] n light
of Chambers, we believe that the appellant was denied due process
of law. Appellant was denied the opportunity to establish his de'4 1
fense to the offense for which he was tried and convicted."
The ramifications of the Hackett decision are many. In its
broadest connotations the decision represents a continuing recognition by the Pennsylvania judiciary of an enlarging concept of due
process as it relates to the admissibility of certain types of evidence.42 In Hackett, the court held that due process precludes an
35. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. at 27, 307 A.2d at 338.
36. 216 Pa. Super. 303, 264 A.2d 424 (1970).
37. Id. at 27, 307 A.2d at 336.
38. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
39. Id. at 302. In Chambers, the petitioner was convicted of the murder of a police officer. In his defense, Chambers offered the testimony of
three individuals that one McDonald declared to them that he and not
Chambers killed the police officer. The trial court sustained the objections
to the admissibility of such evidence and the Supreme Court of Mississippi
affirmed the trial court's decision by holding that "[t]he only testimony
that the trial judge excluded from the jury was the hearsay testimony" of
the three witnesses. Chambers v. Mississippi, - Miss. -, 252 So. 2d 217,
220 (1971).
40. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 302.
41. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. 22, 29, 307 A.2d 334, 338.
42. Prior to the decision reached in this case the concept of due process
with regard to evidence began branching out to such situations as an accused's in custody statements in response to interrogation when the accused
was not advised of his constitutional rights, Commonwealth v. Davis, 440
Pa. 123, 270 A.2d 199 (1970), a conviction without any supporting evidence,
United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundee, 268 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Pa. 1967),
aff'd, 405 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969); self-incrimination, Commonwealth v.

Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

automatic invocation of the hearsay rule. 43 Additionally, the
court concluded the decision by basing its holding on a broad tripartite foundation composed of public policy, the fundamental principles of fairness and due process of law. 44 Such a broad foundation, supporting the view that the exclusion of declarations against
penal interest is under certain conditions unconstitutional, renders it possible either that other exclusionary rules of evidence may
be declared unconstitutional or that evidentiary rules which would
preclude the admission of certain evidence by a prosecutor will be
held inapplicable to a criminal defendant due to the constitutional
guarantees afforded to the latter. In its more limited connotation,
it is clear that the heretofore established arguments for admitting
declarations against penal interest are now augmented in their argumentative strength by a constitutional guarantee of due process.
Each authority cited in Hackett which was decided prior to the decision in Chambers and which spoke to the issue of the admissibility
of declarations against penal interest relied exclusively upon evidentiary theory without considering constitutional imperatives. 45
Although the same reasoning was utilized in Hackett, it was substantially reinforced by the constitutional argument of insuring the
right of due process to the criminal defendant.46 Furthermore,
whether the Hackett decision would have been reached without the
47
Chambersprecedent is doubtful.
Carrera, 424 Pa. 551, 227 A.2d 627 (1967); and unlawful searches, Commonwealth v. Cockfield, 431 Pa. 636, 246 A.2d 381 (1969).
43. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. 22, 29-30, 307 A.2d 334,
338.
44. Id. at 29-30, 307 A.2d at 338.
45. Justice Holmes, dissenting from the opinion in Donnelly v. United
States, 228 U.S. 243, 277, Professor Wigmore arguing in his treatise published
in 1940, 5 WIGMORE § 1477, Justice Traynor addressing himself to the present
issue in the case of People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 808, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1964), Justice Bergan rendering a decision in People v. Brown,
26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970), and finally Judge Hoffman, dissenting in both Commonwealth v. Honigman, 216 Pa. Super. 303,
264 A.2d 424 (1970) (dissenting opinion), and Commonwealth v. Somershoe,
217 Pa. Super. 156, 157, 269 A.2d 149 (1970) (dissenting opinion), all relied
upon pure evidentiary theories.
46. See Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. 22, 307 A.2d 334
(1973).
47. While two factors, i.e., the court's limitation, following precedent
set in Commonwealth v. Antonini, 165 Pa. Super. 501, 69 A.2d 436 (1941),
of accepting declarations against penal interest only when it exculpates the
defendant, Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. 22, 26, 307 A.2d 334,
338, and the opinion's partial reliance on the arguments enunciated in the
dissents to Commonwealth v. Somershoe, 217 Pa. Super. 156, 157, 265 A.2d
149 (1970) (dissenting opinion), and Commonwealth v. Honigman, 216 Pa.
Super. 303, 264 A.2d 424 (1970) (dissenting opinion), suggest that Hackett
may have been decided without the Chambers precedent, many more

In review, the court held that as a result of surrounding circumstances, the exclusion from evidence of a declaration against
penal interest denied the defendant due process. In developing
this exception to the hearsay rule, the court relied only in small
part upon the traditional arguments supporting the exception, while
relying almost exclusively upon the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. Thus, to the concept of due process has been
added the notion that exclusionary rules of evidence must be relaxed under certain circumstances.
Correlatively, arguments
against exclusionary rules of evidence can be supported by due
process reasoning.
The impact of these conclusions may be auspicious. Hearsay
introduced by a criminal defendant that does not lie within one of
the established exceptions to the hearsay rule can no longer be held
to be inadmissible per se. In the future, courts must consider public policy, fundamental principles of fairness and due process of
law before ruling upon the validity of the prosecutor's objections
to hearsay evidence and possibly all other rules of evidence that
may deprive a defendant of his constitutional rights.
MICHAEL I. LEviN

forceful factors suggest an opposite conclusion. First, after citing the
fact that the United States Supreme Court in deciding Chambers required
that declarations against penal interest be admitted under certain circumstances, the Hackett court declares, as if obliged to do so, that "[u]nder
these circumstances, an exception to the hearsay rule . . . is mandatory"
(emphasis added). Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. 22, 30, 307
A.2d 334, 338. Second, the court's adoption of the concept used in Chambers
that a criminal defendant must be provided with an opportunity to defend
himself by being afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, id. at 29,
307 A.2d at 338, illustrates the extent to which the court feels its holding
is constitutionally mandated. Finally, the court's incorporation into its reasoning of the Chambers caveat to the effect that "[i]n reaching this judgment we establish no principles of constitutional law ....
Rather we hold
quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings
of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial." (Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973)), suggests that the Hackett decision is limited in scope to this particular case, and cases very much like it. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. 22, 29 307 A.2d 334, 338 (1973).
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